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ABSTRACT. In the 1920s, Canada developed and promoted a sector
claim to the Arctic archipelago based on the 1880 transfer from Great
Britain and on subsequent occupation, as expressed in licensing, patrols,
and posts. The fact that in July 1909 the government-sponsored explorer
J.E. Bernier had claimed the sector by planting a flag, indeed, the fact
that Canada had him planting flags at all, complicated if not contradicted
this narrative. This research note shows that Canadian government
officials of the 1920s misunderstood or, more likely, deliberately mischaracterised Bernier’s earlier sovereignty work, and in doing so have
distorted our historical understanding of it. The note also argues that,
contrary to recent writing in this journal, it is likely that Bernier did not
make an earlier sector claim in August 1907.

Introduction
On 1 July 1909, J.E. Bernier, captain of the Canadian patrol ship
Arctic, bolted a plaque to Parry’s Rock on Melville Island and
claimed for Canada the entire Arctic archipelago, all the way
to the North Pole. It was an audacious act, introducing to international practice what became known as the sector principle,
under which northern nations would assert ownership of all the
territory between their western and eastern boundaries to the
Pole. It was more audacious because Bernier acted without the
direction of the government employing him. The significance
of Bernier’s declaration has been contested ever since, its
dubious legitimacy battling with the fact that it was made at all.
Was it a beachhead, positioning Canada for subsequent more
meaningful demonstrations of sovereignty? Or was it irrelevant,
perhaps even weakening Canadian title that came from Great
Britain’s 1880 transfer of its northern possessions? Yet when
the authors of a recent book on Canadian sovereignty disdain
Bernier’s act as ‘totally symbolic’ (Coates 2008: 29) while the
Canadian Prime Minister praises it as akin to completion of the
transcontinental railroad (Harper 2008), they are essentially in
agreement that its meaning rests in its mythic character. They
just disagree concerning whether that counts for much. In a
2010 article, I explored the roots of Bernier’s act in the context
of his decade-long attempt to have Canada sponsor him on an
expedition to the Pole, and his 1909 acceptance that Peary or
Cook would make it first. I also argued that although Bernier
was modern enough to recognise the value of making the claim
so theatrically he was not quite modern enough to believe his
fame would rest on such a fundamentally symbolic act, and
so was often surprisingly cavalier in describing it thereafter
(MacEachern 2010).
In a recent research note in this journal, Janice Cavell
bypasses the symbolic value of Bernier’s sector claim and
argues, more so than any previous writer, that he actively
harmed Canadian interests. She contends that in the 1920s the
work by Interior ministry civil servants to promote a sector

claim based on actual occupation was almost undone by the
attention still devoted to Bernier. What’s more, those who study
Bernier today, myself explicitly included, risk repeating this.
Cavell’s note ends, ‘Canadian writers who elevate Bernier and
his claims are inadvertently doing a disservice to their country’
(Cavell 2012: 3), thus framing a matter of historical enquiry
in terms of national loyalty. Cavell herself has published on
Bernier three times in this journal during the past two years,
including a research note that identified an August 1907 claim
he made as an earlier, overlooked sector claim. Thus elevating
it, in other words (Cavell 2010, 2011, 2012).
I made the same discovery about the 1907 claim when
researching my 2010 article. I emphatically deny Cavell’s claim
in her March 2012 note in Polar Record that she led me to my
find. Although we were in contact early in the research process,
we ultimately researched and wrote our works independently.
My continuing research on Bernier has uncovered evidence
that questions the narrative Cavell presents. She sees Bernier
in the late 1920s as lobbying to win public recognition for his
two sector claims (including to have his 1907 one revealed) and
senior civil servants as thwarting his efforts so as to protect the
version of the sector principle that they were championing. This
narrative is offered as proof of how ‘deeply misguided’ Bernier
was. But my research shows that Bernier’s sovereignty work
earlier in the century was either misunderstood or, more likely,
deliberately mischaracterised by these officials. The episode
therefore speaks less to how Bernier ‘obscured the strong
foundation’ of the civil servants’ work (Cavell 2012: 3) and
more to how they obscured his. The evidence also suggests that
Bernier did not in fact make a sector claim in August 1907.

Rewriting history
When J.E. Bernier retired in 1925, he embarked on a public
campaign to win recognition for his contributions to Arctic
exploration and sovereignty. Officials in the Department of the
Interior closely monitored stories about him in the press. In a
1928 instance cited by Cavell, Oswald Sterling Finnie, Director
of the North-West Territories and Yukon Branch, complained to
his superior about what Bernier was saying. Most troubling to
Finnie, ‘His statements make it appear that we had some doubt
as to the validity of the Imperial Order in Council of 1880,
and that it was necessary to supplement that by planting the
flag’ (Finnie, O.S. 1928). But Bernier had not mentioned the
1880 transfer, so Finnie’s criticism was evidently directed less
at Bernier’s statements about his missions than at the necessity
of the missions themselves.
The Interior ministry of the 1920s was advancing a linear
version of Arctic sovereignty, under which once granted the
archipelago, Canada slowly but unwaveringly took steps to occupy it. Bernier’s flag-planting complicated, if not contradicted,
this narrative by suggesting that Canada had felt obliged to
claim the lands once again. But the inconvenient truth was that
early in the century Canada did have doubts about the 1880 title,
which was why the Wilfrid Laurier government had directed
Bernier to take possession of each northern island he reached.
That these were Bernier’s orders is beyond dispute, evident in
the government’s official orders, his official published reports,
and Hansard. (See, for example, Gourdeau 1906; Bernier 1909:

NOTE

12; Canada, House of Commons 1908: 4748; Cavell 2011: 303).
Since the documents surrounding the title were held by Britain
for forty years and only forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior
in 1921 (Grant 2010: 167), there is the temptation to suppose that Finnie did not know that his predecessors harboured
doubts, or why. But there was sufficient institutional memory to
summon up policy of two decades earlier, and the published
accounts of the Arctic voyages outlined the motivation and
practice of claiming land regardless. Finnie took issue with
Bernier fundamentally not because he thought the Captain was
revising history but because the Captain personified the actual
history.
A more egregious episode occurred two years later. On
12 November 1930, the press reported that the Canadian government was paying the Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup
$67,000 for his maps and papers. This was, in truth, so that
Norway would relinquish its claims to the Sverdrup Islands.
The very next day, J.E. Bernier wrote to the Acting Prime
Minister Sir George Perley reminding him of his long service
(Bernier 1930). Whereas Cavell interprets Bernier as seeking
a polite response he could use in his publicity campaign and
perhaps permission finally to broadcast his 1907 sector claim,
it is clear he was hoping for financial compensation along the
line of Sverdrup’s. (Just that month, he had asked that his
annual pension be raised by half (Anon. 1930)). Bernier’s letter
was sent to O.S. Finnie, who drafted a memo for his superior.
Finnie had spent much of that autumn representing his ministry
in the Sverdrup negotiations, and knew that the Norwegians
had explicitly stated that relinquishing the islands in no way
constituted an acceptance of the sector principle (Steen 1930).
It is likely that he felt it was no time for Bernier to be indulged.
Finnie’s memo began, ‘there is no record showing that Captain
Bernier was ever, at any time, formally commissioned by our
Government to claim any areas in the Arctic for Canada’
(Finnie, O.S. 1930). As noted above, this was factually wrong,
as published and unpublished records of Bernier’s voyages
attested, and it is difficult to imagine that Finnie did not know
it. Even the fact that Finnie proceeded to call it absurd for the
Captain to have claimed islands distant from where he was, let
alone the whole sector, negated his initial argument that Bernier
had no right to claim any areas at all.
Cavell calls Finnie’s memo ‘perhaps the clearest statement
of the government’s stand on Bernier and his proclamations’
(Cavell 2012: 2). But in discussing it she paraphrases Finnie’s
quotation above as a denial of Bernier’s ‘sweeping claims’ and
refers to the memo later as a rejection of Bernier’s ‘sector
claims’, failing to note that Finnie rejected the legitimacy of
Bernier making any claims whatsoever. In doing so, she gives
Finnie’s opinion a credibility it does not deserve. The irony
is that if Cavell had pointed out Finnie’s misinformation it
would have strengthened her argument, by showing just how
far Interior civil servants were willing to go to ensure that their
version of history held sway.

One claim or two?
Cavell and I separately uncovered the fact that in a 3 October
1907 letter to his superiors, Bernier described a claim he had
made on 12 August in sector terms: ‘We took possession of
North Lincoln and Cone Island, and all adjacent islands, as
far as ninety degrees north.’ A small, handwritten ‘x’ beside
the final phrase indicates the Laurier government rejected this
categorisation (Bernier 1907b). Bernier was presumably told
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not to speak of the claim in sector terms again, and he did not
describe it as such in his official report. Cavell now treats this
apparent sector claim as a given, citing Bernier’s ‘1907 sector
claim’ or plural ‘sector claims’ at least ten times in her most
recent note (Cavell 2012).
But there is every reason to believe Bernier did not actually
make a sector claim on 12 August 1907. The diary of Arctic
crewman J.A. Simpson makes that day’s landings to have been
entirely without ceremony. And without the presence of Captain
Bernier himself: it was only the Chief and Second Officers
who went ashore and took possession (Simpson 1907). Nor
is there any indication in the archival record of the Canadian
government being concerned that a cairn sitting in the north,
accessible to explorers and whalers of other nations, referred to
the claim in sector terms. Indeed, when a record left on Cone
Island by Arctic was discovered by an Inuk in 1920 and turned
over to Canada by the Danish government, it matched wordfor-word how it was described in the official report (Bernier
1907a, 1909: 50). The only evidence whatsoever that a 12
August 1907 sector claim took place is the six words ‘as far as
ninety degrees north’ written almost two months later. But that
phrasing may just have been Bernier’s unthinking shorthand
for the known islands beyond Ellesmere or a belated reflection
of what he wished he had claimed. There is no evidence that
Bernier challenged or was disappointed by the government’s
refusal to have that day’s claim described as a sector claim.
In fact, having examined not only the relevant government
records at Library and Archives Canada but also Bernier’s
extensive personal papers at Archives Nationales du Québec,
I have found no evidence that Bernier ever mentioned a 1907
sector claim again. Cavell attempts to demonstrate the significance of the 12 August 1907 claim by noting Bernier’s references
to it in later correspondence, but she offers no example of him
describing it in sector terms. Just the opposite, in fact. When
Bernier contacted the Acting Prime Minister, Perley, in the 1930
episode discussed earlier, his description of the 12 August 1907
claim was taken from his official report, that is, in the phrasing
he used after expunging the sector reference he had originally
reported (Bernier 1930). Cavell nonetheless argues that Bernier
may have been hoping to finally get the chance to reveal his
1907 sector claim. But how could this hope be strengthened by
his describing the claim in other than sector terms?
Cavell’s overrating of Bernier’s 1907 claim has the paradoxical effect of helping her underrate his 1909 one. Her recent note
argues that Bernier’s highly symbolic claims have long eclipsed
the more down-to-earth case for occupation, built on posts and
patrols, which the Interior civil servants developed. As such,
she draws no meaningful distinction between the two sector
claims, between on the one hand six never-repeated words and
on the other a declaration that was made with ceremony on a
plaque attached to the side of Parry’s Rock, was recognised by
the Canadian government, was publicised by the media, was
published in the official report, and has become a staple in
discussion of Canadian Arctic sovereignty right down to the
present.
If Bernier’s historical role now risks misinterpretation, I
bear some responsibility, having also written of how his October
1907 letter showed him defining a claim in sector terms. But
to me the significance of the 1907 letter is that it puts his 1909
claim in a new light. Whether Bernier had intended to provoke a
reaction from the Laurier government or not, he learned in 1907
that it expressly did not want him making a sector claim. And
yet given the first chance to do so, in 1909 he did just that. He
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just did it with much more ceremony, making it more difficult
for the government to refuse what he had done.

Conclusion
In many ways the Interior officials were right about Bernier and
his 1909 sector claim. He was by all accounts something of a
megalomaniac. He gave himself too much credit for his role in
Canadian Arctic sovereignty. His version of the sector principle,
devoid of national political authority, let alone international
legal precedent, had less legitimacy than the one subsequently
developed in Interior, so his continued presence on the scene
was a distraction if not an impediment. But none of that changes
the historical context in which Bernier made his claims, or
changes the fact that the Interior civil servants rewrote the
historical record for their own purposes when dealing with him.
And for a historian to point that out has nothing to do with
patriotism.
In evaluating Bernier’s contribution, I side with an author
who sailed with him in the 1920s and wrote several profiles on
him later in life. Of Bernier having claimed islands everywhere,
he wrote, ‘His critics laughed at this practice as well as at
the Captain’s vanity, but at least it was a Canadian who was
now affirming Canada’s ownership of the archipelago which
. . . had been transferred – but in somewhat vague terms –
by the British Government to Canada in 1880.’ That is the
conclusion reached by Richard Finnie, writer, filmmaker, and
son of Oswald Sterling (Finnie, R.S. 1942: 20).
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